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Hopwood v. Texas: The Beginning of the End
for Racial Preference Programs in Higher
Education

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In Hopwood v. Texas,' the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held
that the University of Texas ("UT") School of Law's admissions program,
which gave preference to African-Americans and Mexican-Americans,
violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.2 For
the 1992 school year, the University of Texas School of Law processed
applications by using an applicant's Texas Index ("TI") number, a figure
comprised of the applicant's undergraduate grade point average and Law
School Admissions Test ("LSAT") score.' Based on the TI, the law
school distributed applications into three categories of review: presumptive admit, presumptive deny, and discretionary zone.4 For resident
whites and nonpreferred minorities, the law school usually considered
199 to be the minimum presumptive admit score and 192 to be the
maximum presumptive deny score.5 As part of the school's policy to
admit more minorities, however, the law school reduced these two scores
for African-American and Mexican-Americans to 189 and 179 respectively.6 The admissions board hoped to admit a class that reflected the
percentage of African-Americans (five percent) and Mexican-Americans
(ten percent) who graduated from Texas colleges.' Of the Texas
resident applicants, the law school's preference admitted one-hundred
percent of the African-Americans, ninety percent of the MexicanAmericans, but only six percent of the whites.'

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
78 F.3d at 932.
Id. at 935.
Id.
Id. at 936.
Id.

7. Id. at 937.
8. Id.

942

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

In addition to the TI reductions, the UT School of Law also reviewed
preferred minority applications differently than nonpreferred minority
applications by separating the minority applications from the nonpreferred applicants.9 For those minority candidates who fell in the
discretionary zone, a subcommittee met and extensively discussed each
candidate."' The admissions office never individually reviewed each
nonpreferred applicant with such care, and it never compared the
preferred applicants to the nonpreferred applicants."
In 1991 and 1992, Cheryl Hopwood and three other white Texas
residents applied for admission to the 1992 entering class at the UT
School of Law.1" Despite TI scores ranging from 199 to 197, the law
school rejected all four applicants." Believing that the law school
discriminated against them, the four individuals brought suit in the
Western District of Texas."' They claimed that the admissions policy
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983," and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. ' 6

The district court found that the law school violated plaintiffs' equal
protection rights, but refused to enjoin the school from making admission
decisions based on race.17 Applying strict scrutiny, the court upheld
the school's use of different TI scores for various races."i Thus, the
district court allowed the law school to continue to use racial preferences
in the application process.' Nevertheless, the court decided that the
use of separate admission committees violated plaintiffs' equal protection
rights,2 and concluded that the admissions committee's failure to
compare each applicant to the entire pool of all applicants resulted in
the program's violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause.2 1 In effect, the law school did not narrowly tailor the program
to meet 2the
goals of remedying past discrimination and achieving
2
diversity.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14,
15.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 938.
Id.
Id.
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1994).

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. § 2000d.
78 F.3d at 938.
Id. at 939.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Following plaintiffs' appeal of the district court's ruling, the Fifth
Circuit held that the UT School of Law may not use race as an
admissions factor in order to: (1) achieve a diverse student body; (2)
combat the perceived effects of a hostile environment; (3) alleviate the
law school's poor reputation in the minority community; and (4)
eliminate the present effects of past discrimination by parties other than
the law school.2" It allowed plaintiffs to reapply to the law school
under a constitutionally valid admissions plan and remanded the
question of damages to the district court.24
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke2" marked the first
time the United States Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality
of minority preference admissions policies in higher education.26 Allan
Bakke, a white male, applied twice to the University of California at
Davis Medical School.2" Despite grades and Medical College Admissions Test scores which were higher than admitted minority applicants,
the medical school denied him admission both times.2" With no opinion
receiving more than four votes, a divided Court partially upheld Bakke's
claim that the medical school's affirmative action program violated the
Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.29
But, at the same time, Justice Powell's decisive opinion held that
universities could take account of an applicant's race in some circumstances.3 0 Because no opinion garnered more than four votes on any
issue, it left open the appropriate scrutiny level for analysis of preferential admissions programs.3 1
Justice Powell's crucial opinion concluded that the Fourteenth
Amendment applies to all races equally and does not protect one racial

23. Id. at 962.
24. Id.
25. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).

26. Id. at 265.
27. Id. at 276.
28. Id. at 276-77.
29. Id. at 271-72.

30. Id. at 296 n.36.
31. Id. at 271-72. Justice Powell applied strict scrutiny. Id. at 290. Justices Brennan,
White, Marshall, and Blackmun applied an intermediate level of review. Id. at 359. Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Stevens, and Rehnquist did not address the

constitutionality of the admissions policy because they believed the Title VI issue was
dispositive of the entire claim; thus, they did not apply a scrutiny level. Id. at 412-13. See
also Krista L. Cosner, Comment, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Lessons and
Directionsfrom the Supreme Court, 71 IND. L.J. 1003, 1018 (Fall 1996).
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group more than, another.3 2 Unwilling to interpret the Constitution as
giving African-Americans and Mexican-Americans more protection than
whites, Justice Powell stated: "Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort
are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial
examination."33 In addressing whether the admissions program served
a compelling interest under strict scrutiny, Justice Powell discounted the
goals of reducing the deficit of minorities in medical school; 34 combating
the effects of societal discrimination;3s and increasing the number of
doctors who will practice in under-served communities.36 However,
Justice Powell concluded that the admissions program's fourth rationale,
promotion of diversity, reflected a constitutionally permissible goal.37
He wrote: "The atmosphere of 'speculation, experiment and creation'-so
essential to the quality of higher edcation-is widely believed to be
promoted by a diverse student body."38
Despite his recognition of diversity as a compelling interest, Justice
Powell qualified its use as a rationale. In his view, the diversity
foundation could not focus solely on an applicant's race. 39 For diversity
to suffice as a compelling state interest, it would have to encompass a
number of different characteristics of which race acted as a single
element.40 Universities could view race only as a "plus" in the admissions process.4 Due to the Court's divisions, the decision in Bakke did
not substantially clarify the picture surrounding remedial based
preference programs.
The Court remained elusive when it tackled affirmative action in
Fullilove v. Klutznick4 2 two years later. Fullilove addressed the
constitutionality of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977 which
required at least ten percent of federal funds awarded for local public
works projects to be set aside to obtain services from minority business-

32. 438 U.S. at 289-90.
33. Id. at 291.
34. Id. at 307.
35. Id. Justice Powell considered the purpose of remedying the effects of societal
discrimination to be "an amorphous concept of injury that may be ageless in its reach into
the past. We have never approved a classification that aids persons perceived as members
of relatively victimized groups at the expense of other innocent individuals in the absence
of judicial, legislative, or administrative findings." Id.
36. Id. at 311.
37. Id. at 311-12.

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 312.
Id. at 315.
Id.
Id. at 317.
448 U.S. 448 (1980).
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es. 43 Although the Court held the federal program to be facially
consistent with the Fifth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, it did
not resolve the scrutiny level question left open in Bakke."' Nonetheless, Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion stated that the set aside
would survive "either 'test' articulated in the several Bakke opinions."45
Burger justified the program on the ground that it remedied the present
effects of past discrimination." Unlike Justice Powell's opinion in
Bakke, which rejected preference programs premised on accounting for
past societal discrimination, the decision in Fullilove upheld the Act's
program because Congress intended that the Act halt the denial of
public contracting opportunities to minority businesses.47
Several years later in 1986, the Court in Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education4" confronted the issue of affirmative action in employment. 49 A majority of the Court held that a termination plan preferring minority teachers over white teachers with greater seniority
violated the Fourteenth Amendment.' ° As with the prior affirmative
action cases, the Court was unable to muster a majority on the scrutiny
level question. Justice Powell's plurality opinion applied strict scrutiny
and required the racial classification to be justified by a compelling
interest and the plan to be narrowly tailored to the achievement of the
interest.5 " As in Bakke, the plurality reiterated that remedying societal

43. Id. at 448.
44, Id. at 492. Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion did not apply a scrutiny level.
Id. at 491-92. The concurrence by Justice Powell applied strict scrutiny. Id. at 496.
Justice Marshall's concurrence applied intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 519.
45. Id. at 492.
46. Id. at 478.
47. Id. at 473. The program at issue in Fullilove was a purely remedial program, as
opposed to the program in Bakke. Id. at 481. Justice Powell's concurrence in Fullilove
recognized this distinction. He maintained that the race-conscious remedy constituted a
compelling interest because: (1) the governmental body imposing the remedy (Congress)
had the authority to respond to the discrimination; and (2) that governmental body had
evidence of illegal discrimination. Id. at 498. Although Fullilove does not answer the
scrutiny level question, Justice Powell's concurrence recognizes that pure remedial
programs might constitute a compelling interest when the federal government institutes
them in response to identified discrimination. Id. at 496.
48. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
49. Id. at 267.
50. Id. at 284. In Wygant, a collective bargaining agreement between the board of
education and the teacher's union established that the school board would conduct lay-offs
based on seniority, except that at no time would there be a larger proportion of minority
teachers laid off than the current proportion of minorities at the time of the lay-off. Id. at
270.
51. Id. at 273-74. Powell cited his language from Bakke and stated that "'[riacial and
ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting
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discrimination did not constitute a compelling interest.5 2 Although the
Court did not conclusively address permissibility of remedying the
present effects of prior discrimination, it implied that such an interest
may be compelling if the employer has a strong evidentiary basis to
support remedial action.5 3 Finally, Wygant rejected the "role model"
for minority students)
theory (minority teachers would act as role models
4
as a compelling reason for the classification.
Less than three years later, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,55
a majority of the Court adopted part of the Wygant plurality opinion and
finally clarified several of the issues left unresolved."6 In Croson, the
City of Richmond mandated that construction companies awarded
contracts by the city subcontract at least thirty percent of each contract
to "Minority Business Enterprises."57 Distinguishing Fullilove, where
Congress established the set aside program, Justice O'Connor's majority
opinion held that the local set aside program in Croson violated the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause."
The decision in Croson is significant because it established strict
scrutiny as the appropriate scrutiny level for reviewing any case
involving racial preferences.59 Justice O'Connor rationalized strict
scrutiny by concluding it would both "'smoke out' illegitimate uses of
race" and would reduce the danger of stigmatic harm." In addition,
Croson reiterated the difference between remedying past societal
discrimination and remedying the present effects of past discrimination.6 1 Citing Wygant, the Court held that only the latter produces an
adequate rationale for race based classifications, provided that the
governmental body imposing the classification specifically can identify

judicial examination.'" Id. at 273 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291). He also interpreted
Chief Justice Burger's use of a "searching examination" from Fullilove as corresponding to
strict scrutiny. Id. at 274.
52. Id. at 274-76.
53. Id. at 277. The Court stated, "a public employer like the Board must ensure that,
before it embarks on an affirmative-action program, it has convincing evidence that
remedial action is warranted. That is, it must have sufficient evidence to justify the
conclusion that there has been prior discrimination." Id.
54. Id. at 275. Powell noted that "the role model theory does not necessarily bear a
relationship to the harm caused by prior discriminatory hiring practices." Id. at 276.
55. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
56. Id. at 469.
57. Id. at 477.
58. Id. at 505.
59. Id. at 493-94, 505.
60. Id. at 493.
61. Id. at 497-500.
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the discrimination within the affected industry. 2 Because Richmond
could not clearly prove past discrimination within the Richmond
construction industry, its intent to remedy the present effects of past
discrimination was not compelling. 63 Furthermore, due to the existence
of other race neutral remedies, Richmond failed to narrowly tailor the
program to its objectives. 64
Just as a majority of the Court finally recognized strict scrutiny as the
appropriate standard of review in Croson, matters became unclear again
in Metro Broadcasting,Inc. u. FCC.65 Metro Broadcasting addressed
the constitutionality of a federal program which gave preference to
minority controlled radio and television stations that applied to the FCC
for licenses." Unlike Croson, the majority upheld the program using
intermediate scrutiny, the scrutiny level Justice Marshall urged in his
Fulliove concurrence, arguing that this was the appropriate scrutiny
level for congressional programs employing benign racial classifications.6 7 Justice Brennan, writing for the Metro Broadcastingmajority,
upheld the goal of achieving programming diversity as an important
governmental objective." In fact, Brennan referred to Powell's opinion
from Bakke and wrote, "Mjlustas a 'diverse student body' contributing to
a 'robust exchange of ideas' is a 'constitutionally permissible goal' on
which a race-conscious university admissions program may be predicated, the diversity of views and information on the airwaves serves
important First Amendment values." 9
The intermediate scrutiny level analysis used in Metro Broadcasting
was short-lived. In 1995, Adarand Constructors,Inc. u. Pena7" partially
overturned Metro Broadcastingand held that "[tlo the extent that Metro
Broadcasting is inconsistent [with strict scrutiny] it is overruled."7'
Adarand involved a congressional program that provided financial

62. Id. at 499-500.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 507. Justice O'Connor stated that city financing of small firms, relaxation
of bonding requirements, and simplification of bidding procedures could open up the
construction industry to minorities. Such measures, however, would not require taking
race into account. Id. at 509-10.
65. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
66. Id. at 557-58.
67. Id. at 564-65.
68. Id. at 566. Because the Court used intermediate scrutiny, it did not have to
address the question of whether diversity is a compelling interest. Id.
69. Id. at 568 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-13).
70. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
71. Id. at 2113.
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incentives to contractors that employed disadvantaged subcontractors. 2
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion reasoned that equal protection
analysis under the Fifth Amendment is the same as for the Fourteenth
Amendment, and that all racial classifications are subject to strict
scrutiny.73 Justice O'Connor recognized that Croson established the
appropriate scrutiny level for racial preference programs and viewed
Metro Broadcasting as straying from established precedent. 74 Adarand
never confronted the compelling interest question, because the Court
remanded the case once it resolved the scrutiny level7 5
In 1994, the Fourth Circuit in Podberesky v. Kirwan7 ' had to apply
the evolving case doctrine on minority preference programs to a
University of Maryland scholarship program open only to AfricanAmerican students.7 7 The Fourth Circuit applied strict scrutiny and
rejected the scholarship program." Basing much of the opinion on
Croson, the court failed to find a sufficient connection between past
discrimination and the scholarship program's effect thereon.79
The many different views, and the frequent inability to obtain a
majority, make following the Court's convoluted lead surrounding racial
preference programs a difficult task. Just as the Fourth Circuit had to
look to the Supreme Court for guidance concerning racial preferences in
higher education, the Fifth Circuit had to give meaning to the Court's
opinions in Hopwood.

72. Id. at 2103-04. Included in the definition of "disadvantaged" were minority-owned
construction firms. Id.
73. Id. at 2111.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 2118.
76. 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994), cert denied, 115 S. Ct. 2001 (1995).
77. 38 F.3d at 147.
78. Id. at 161.
79. Id. at 154-56. The University alleged that four present effects of past discrimination existed at the school: (1) a poor reputation within the African.American community;
(2) an under-representation of African-Americans in the student population; (3) a low
retention rate for African-American students; and (4) an atmosphere hostile to AfricanAmerican students. Thus, they viewed the scholarship program as remedying these
present effects. Id. at 152. The court rejected all four of these effects as being sufficient
to justify the scholarship program. Id. at 151. Concerning the poor reputation and hostile
environment effects, the court held that knowledge of historical fact is not a present effect
that can justify a race exclusive remedy. Id. at 154. In terms of the remaining two effects,
the University failed to demonstrate that the under-representation and higher attrition
rate was connected to the prior discrimination. Id. at 155.
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III. FIFTH CIRCUIT'S RATIONALE
The Fifth Circuit issued its decision in Hopwood more than a year and
a half after the district court.80 Judge Smith began the Fifth Circuit's
analysis by addressing the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause."'
Viewing the Equal Protection Clause as opposed to favoring one racial
group over another, the majority concluded that discrimination based on
any race is highly suspect.8 2 It considered meaningless the fact that a
party may label a classification as benign or remedial.83 Accordingly,
Judge Smith looked to Wygant, Croson, and Adarand and applied strict
scrutiny to the racial preference used by the University of Texas School
of Law. 4 Thus, the racial classification had to serve a compelling
government interest, and it had to be narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest.8 5
For the majority, the law school's admissions policy failed the first
criterion of strict scrutiny. The district court concluded that the two
goals of having a diverse student body, and remedying the present
effects of past discrimination by the University of Texas system and the
Texas educational system, represented compelling interests.8 6 The
Fifth Circuit, however, rejected both of these goals as compelling
government interests.
Although Justice Powell's plurality opinion in Bakke held that
diversity could be a compelling interest, Judge Smith refused to abide by
this conclusion.88 First, the court noted that Powell's swing view in
Bakke was not binding, because his opinion received no other votes.
Second, the court asserted that with the exception of Metro Broadcasting
(which was later overruled in part) and Powell's Bakke opinion, no case
has recognized diversity as a compelling interest.8" According to Judge
Smith, the use of race to establish diversity contradicts the goals of the
Equal Protection Clause because it fosters the use of race." In turn,
he believed this could result in stereotyping and fuel racial animosity.91

80. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d at 932.

81. Id. at 939-40.
82. Id. at 940.
83. Id.

84. Id.
85. Id. (citingAdarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111, 2117).
86. Id. at 938.
87. 78 F.3d at 944, 954.
88. Id. at 944.

89. Id.
90. Id. at 945.
91. Id.
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Despite Judge-Smith's rejection of diversity as a compelling interest, he
did not discount that remedying the present effects of past discrimination could be a compelling interest. 2 Nevertheless, the court held that
the governmental unit involved must show prior discrimination, 9and
it
3
must have convincing evidence that remedial action is necessary.
The court also referred to Croson and held that the use of racial
remedies must be carefully limited and restricted to the state actor who
had previously discriminated.94 Although the district court accepted
the claim that past racial discrimination by the Texas educational
system justified the use of racial classifications, the Fifth Circuit found
this to be overly broad.95 Because the admissions policy attempted to
remedy either discrimination within the University of Texas system, or
the entire Texas state educational system, it was too expansive and not
sufficiently related to past harms within the law school." Judge Smith
wrote: "In order for any of these entities to direct a racial preference
program at the law school, it must be because of past wrongs at that
school."97 The Fifth Circuit cited Podberesky and determined that the
law school could not prove that the "effect [the policy] proffers is caused
by the past discrimination [within the law school] and that the effect is
of sufficient magnitude to justify the program."98 Judge Smith claimed
that the three alleged effects of prior discrimination--( 1) the reputation
that the law school is a "white" school; (2) the under-representation of
minorities at the law school; and (3) the perception that the law school
is a hostile environment for minorities-were only effects of societal
discrimination, as opposed to effects of prior discrimination in the law
school. 9 Only if the law school could prove prior discrimination within
the law school itself might the admissions policy satisfy a compelling
interest."° Because Judge Smith found that the admissions policy did
not constitute a compelling interest, he did not address whether the
program was narrowly tailored.'° 1
Where Judge Smith concluded his opinion, however, -Judge Weiner
began his concurrence. Judge Weiner agreed that the admissions policy
violated the Fourteenth Amendment, but he believed the court could

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 951.
Id. at 949 (citing Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274, 277-78).
Id. at 950, 954 (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 499).
Id. at 953-54.
Id. at 951 & n.43.
Id. at 952.
Id. (citing Podberesky, 38 F.3d at 153).
Id.
Id. at 954.
Id. at 955.
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take a more confined approach by rejecting the program for not being
narrowly tailored.0 2 Weiner asserted that Smith's opinion was "an
extension of the law--one that... is both overly broad and unnecessary
to the disposition of this case."'"' Judge Weiner's concurrence clarified
that he did not think that remedying the effects of past discrimination
was the only compelling interest sufficient to justify racial classifications.G Maintaining that the circuit court should not declare Bakke
dead, Weiner also refused to find that diversity in higher education could
Consequently, he was reluctant to
never be a compelling interest.'
address compelling interests when he could decide the case based on
narrow tailoring.'
For Judge Weiner, because the law school's policy only focused on
African-Americans and Mexican-Americans, the admissions plan was not
narrowly tailored. 07 If the law school sought to achieve diversity, why
had it ignored other minority groups that could contribute to diversity?' Judge Weiner perceived the admissions program as resembling
a quota system for African-Americans and Mexican-Americans rather
than an "academic admissions program narrowly tailored to achieve true
diversity."109
IV

IMPLICATIONS

On July 1, 1996, the Supreme Court declined to review the Fifth
Circuit's ruling in Hopwood."' Because of the Court's refusal to grant
certiorari, the holding in Hopwood will be binding formally only in
Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi, the states which comprise the Fifth
Circuit. Thus, the Court will forgo the opportunity to address the
question of whether Powell's opinion in Bakke, which recognizes
diversity as a compelling interest, is good law.
Despite the limited precedential basis of Hopwood, the Fifth Circuit's
ruling could have profound implications for race-based preference
programs in the area of higher education. Many law school deans fear
that Hopwood will end affirmative action in higher education."'
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 962 (Weiner, J., concurring).,
Id. at 963.
Id. at 964.
Id.
Id. at 965.
Id. at 966.

108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
111. David E. Rovella, Circuit Ruling Challenges 'Bakke,' Threatens Law School
Diversity, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 1, 1996, at A15.
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Because Hopwood recognizes only one justifiable rationale, remedying
the present effects of past discrimination, universities can no longer
admit minorities in an attempt to diversify the student body." 2
According to Yale Law School Professor Paul D. Gewirtz, for most
schools, however, the diversity rationale provides the main basis for
affirmative action programs.'
Gewirtz believes that the rationale for
affirmative
action
is
no
longer
to correct the effects of discrimina14
tion.

Hopwood and Podberesky appear to make the remedying of the present
effects of past discrimination virtually impossible."'
Both courts
refused to view the admissions programs as doing anything more than
remedying past societal discrimination."' At the same time, most of
the affirmative action cases after Bakke addressed affirmative action in
the employment context; thus, very little guidance exists concerning
racial preferences for university admissions." 7 Consequently, public
universities in the Fifth Circuit must follow the lead set out in Hopwood.
One argument holds that the rationale for affirmative action in higher
education is much different than in other areas, and that racial and
cultural diversity is necessary for the educational experience."' If
diversity continues to be treated as something less than a compelling
interest, graduate level education has the potential of becoming virtually
all-white."' As a result, public universities will have to develop other
ways of diversifying their student bodies.
Schools may attempt to replace diversity with a proxy of socioeconomic
disadvantage. 2 In fact, Justice Scalia in his concurrence in Croson
stated: "Since blacks have been disproportionately disadvantaged by
racial discrimination, any race-neutral remedial program aimed at the
disadvantaged as such will have a disproportionately beneficial impact
on blacks."'
Only such a program "'is in accord with the letter and

112. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 945-46.
113. Marcia Coyle, 5th Circuit Takes Shot atDiversity:Panel,ReadingHigh Court'sTea
Leaves, Says Affirmative Action's Best Days are Past, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 8, 1996, at Al.
114. Id.
115. 78 F.3d at 952; Podberesky, 38 F.3d at 153, 157.
116. Id.
117. Coyle, supra note 113, at Al.
118. Id.
119. Jeffrey Rosen, The Day the Quotas Died: Affirmative Action's Posthumous Life,
NEw REPUB., Apr. 22, 1996, at 21.

120. Krista L. Cosner, Note, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Lessons and
Directionsfrom the Supreme Court, 71 IND. L.J. 1003, 1026 (Fall 1996) (citing Croson, 488
U.S. at 528 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
121. Id. (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 528 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
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the spirit of our Constitution.'"'22 Thus, a university admissions board
could give an applicant a "plus" for demonstrating economic disadvantage."2 In addition, universities could try to reduce the emphasis on
admissions tests."' Because studies have shown that such tests are
culturally biased and prefer whites over African-Americans, reducing the
tests could increase the number of minorities
use of standardized
25
admitted.

With the Supreme Court's refusal to review the decision in Hopwood,
the brunt of its impact will occur in the Fifth Circuit. "Nevertheless, a
recent case in the Seventh Circuit, Wittmer v. Peters, 26 cited but did
not apply Hopwood in its analysis of an employment preference
program.127 The plaintiffs in that case cited Hopwood as holding that
strict scrutiny allows preferences only to remedy the present effects of
past discrimination by the institution employing the remedy. 8 The
Seventh Circuit rejected this argument, declaring this claim dicta and
not a holding."2
Regardless of the potential limited effect of Hopwood, by failing to
address the UT School of Law's preference program on a narrower basis,
as the concurrence did, Hopwood may alter the way many schools admit
minorities. Consequently, Hopwood could disrupt the already murky
picture surrounding racial preference programs in higher education.
JEREMY MOESER

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
Feb. 18,
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Cosner, supra note 120, at 1027.
Id.
Id. at 1028.
87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, No. 96-852, 1996 WL 716837 (U.S. S. Ct.
1997).
87 F.3d at 916.
Id.at 919.
Id.

